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DOMESTIC PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL DE-
SIGNS: THE FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT
Join 11. ANDRnWt
T WO recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and two subsequent decisions of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals involving the protection of commercial
designs serve to illustrate the conflict which may occasionally
exist between the national policy of promoting competition
and state law prohibiting unfair competition. It is the
purpose of this article to examine this conflict, to explore
the protection which is available to the originator of a
design which meets with consumer acceptance and to re-
view the basic constitutional considerations which must
be weighed in arriving at a proper understanding of this
area of the law.
STATE PRoTEoTION OF DESIGNS
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Black, held that a commercial
design, lacking in the originality necessary to secure design
patent protection,' may be freely copied by competitors of
t B.A., University of Minnesota; J.D., Northwestern University School
of Law; Member of the Chicago Patent Law Association, the International
Association for the Protection of Industrial Property, and the Illinois Bar.
1376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3 Design patents are granted under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 171
(1958), which requires that the design be new, original and ornamental.
Judge Augustus Hand stated the test of originality in A.C. Gilbert Co. v.
Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1930); "it has many times been held that
there must be originality and taste to justify the granting of a design patent,
and that mere mechanical skill is insufficient. Smith v. Whitman, 148 U.S.
675, 13 S. Ct 768, 37 L. Ed. 606. If the design goes no farther than to
embody an obvious neatness and attractiveness that will make articles of
household use more compact and pleasing than has generally been the case,
this is not in itself enough."
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its originator and that the originator cannot rely upon
state unfair competition law-whether statutory or decisional
-to prevent such copying. The Court based its decisions
upon the patent and copyright 4 and supremacy 5 clauses of
the Constitution, holding that to permit a state to extend
the protection of its unfair competition law "to articles too
lacking in novelty to merit any patent at all ...would be
too great an encroachment on the federal patent system
to be tolerated." 6
In the Sears case, the plaintiff, Stiffel Company, se-
cured design and mechanical patents on a pole lamp it
created. After the lamp had become a commercial success,
Sears copied it and put its copy on the market at a lower
price. Stiffel then brought suit against Sears for infringe-
ment of its design patent and for unfair competition. The
district court held the design patents invalid for want of
invention but, holding that Sears had been guilty of unfair
competition, enjoined it from further trading in the lamps
and ordered an accounting of profits and damages. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.7 •It held
that both the mechanical and design patents had been antic-
ipated by prior art and were, therefore, invalid and not
infringed. The court of appeals agreed, however, with the
finding of the district court that Sears had been guilty of
unfair competition. The court pointed out that the lamps
had "a remarkable sameness of appearance," that Sears
began marketing its lamps only after Stiffel's lamps had
had a decided impact on the market and had been widely
advertised and that Sears' lamps were not labelled. Buyers
for two Chicago stores had testified to customer confusion.
Applying Illinois law,8 the court held that likelihood of
confusion having been found, the conclusion of unfair com-
petition was not erroneous. It rejected Sears' argument
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.6 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
7313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
8 Illinois law applied under the doctrine of Erie MR. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), which was held to apply to unfair competition actions in
Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942), and
Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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that proof of "palming off" or establishment of secondary
meaning was necessary to maintain an unfair competition
action in Illinois.
In Compco, the plaintiff, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
likewise sued for infringement of a design patent and for
unfair competition. Day-Brite is a manufacturer of com-
mercial fluorescent lighting fixtures. In 1954 it began to
sell a new-style ceiling fixture utilizing cross ribs to prevent
warpage of the reflector unit, a condition which had been a
source of complaint concerning its previous ceiling units.
These cross ribs also added to the attractiveness of the
fixture. In 1955 the defendant's predecessor began to manu-
facture fixtures which were almost exact copies of those
designed by Day-Brite. In December 1955 Day-Brite ob-
tained a design patent covering its fixtures and shortly
thereafter gave notice of infringement to Compco and several
other competitors who were offering reflectors similar in
appearance to that covered by Day-Brite's design patent.
Some of the alleged infringers discontinued manufacturing
such reflectors and two of them entered into consent judg-
ments holding the design patent valid and infringed.
Compco refused to discontinue manufacture and, following
trial, the district court held that the design patent was
invalid in that, being a mere functional configuration, it
did not meet the necessary standard of invention. It further
stated that had the patent been valid it would have been
infringed by Compco's reflectors. On the question of unfair
competition the district court found that the design of
Day-Brite's reflectors served to identify it to the trade, that
the sale of Compco's reflectors had caused actual confusion,
and that continued concurrent sale of the two reflectors
was likely to continue to cause confusion. Accordingly,
the court found that defendant had been guilty of unfair
competition and granted an injunction against further sale or
attempted sale of reflectors confusingly similar to plaintiff's
and ordered an accounting of damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court,' holding that
9311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
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although the design patent was invalid the defendant had
been guilty of unfair competition under the existing law
of Illinois. It held that Day-Brite's design had the capacity
to serve "in somewhat the manner of a trademark" and
that this constituted a "protectible" right. The court re-
jected defendant's argument that secondary meaning or
"palming off" must be shown to support a holding of unfair
competition under Illinois law, noting that in Independent
Nail & Packing Co. v. Stronghold Screw Prods., Inc., the
court had said that this was no longer the law of Illinois
and that the appropriate test was "whether the public is
likely to be deceived.""' The court summed up its holding
by citing with approval the statement in Radio Shack Corp.
10205 F2d 921 (7th Cir. 1953).
"1 In his opinion Judge Duffy reviewed the development of the law of
unfair competition in Illinois: "Upon the issue of unfair competition the
trial court correctly stated that the law of Illinois is applicable. Relying on
Stevens-Davis Co. v. Mather and Co., 230 Ill. App. 45, the court held that
as there was no evidence of palming off of its products, defendant was not
guilty of unfair competition.
"Four earlier Illinois cases did establish the requirement of palming off
in unfair competition cases. They are Stevens-Davis Co. v. Mather and Co.,
supra; Delong Hook and Eye Co. v. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co., 297 IIl. 359,
130 N.E 765; Nestor Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Alfred Johnson Skate Co., 313
Ill. 106, 144 N.E. 787; and Ambassador Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Sherman Co.,
226 I1. App. 247. However, we think the rule announced in these cases is
no longer the law of Illinois.
"In 1942 the Supreme Court of Illinois in Investors Syndicate of
America, Inc. v. Edward J. Hughes, Secretary of State, 378 Ill. 413, at page
422, 38 N.E.2d 754, at page 759, stated 'even in injunction cases between
competing corporations the trend of decision is to place less emphasis on
competition and more on confusion, as is evidenced by the following cases
.... The test should be whether the public is likely to be deceived.' In 1943
the Illinois Appellate Court, in Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset
Shoppe, 317 I1. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165, 148 A.L.R. 6, restrained defendant
from conducting a corset business under the name 'Lady Esther Corset
Shoppe' on the ground that the defendant was competing unfairly with
plaintiff which had been engaged in the cosmetic business for years under
the name 'Lady Esther.' It is obvious there could be no palming off. Of
course the Lady Esther case did not turn upon the use of similar names
alone; it was a case of similar names plus a secondary meaning attached to
one of them.
"We think that the test under the Illinois law is whether the adoption
and use of a name by defendant is likely to cause confusion in the trade
as to the source of products, or is likely to lead the public to believe that
the defendant is in some way connected with the plaintiff. judge Campbell,
in Elastic Shop Nut Corp. v. Greer, 62 F. Supp. 363, decided in 1945, and
judge Holly in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n
of Chicago, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 127, decided in 1948, agreed that in Illinois
palming off is no longer necessary to sustain a cause of action for unfair
competition." Id. at 926.
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v. Raadio Shack, Inc, 12 that "in all cases of unfair com-
petition, it is principles of old-fashioned honesty which are
controlling."
In both Sears and Compco the defendants petitioned
for certiorari to review the holding of unfair competition.
Neither plaintiff sought review of the holding that its de-
sign patent was invalid. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in both Sears'3 and Compco'4 and the United States
government appeared as amicus curiae.
The decisions in both cases, delivered by Mr. Justice
Black, were handed down on March 9, 1964-. Mr. Justice
Harlan authored a short, separate opinion in which he con-
curred with the results in both cases. No dissents were filed.
In the Sears case, the first to be decided, Mr. Justice
Black declared the question to be "whether a State's unfair
competition law can, consistently with the federal patent
laws, impose liability for or prohibit the copying of an
article which is protected by neither a federal patent nor a
copyright." 5 The Court held that it could not. In reaching
this result the Court reviewed the history of the patent and
copyright clause of the Constitution 8 and the statutes
enacted pursuant thereto.' The Court pointed out that
these laws are, like all laws of the United States enacted
pursuant to constitutional authority, the supreme law of
the land, 8 and that when state law is in conflict with federal
law the latter must, of course, prevail. 9 After briefly re-
12 180 F2d 200, 206 (7th Cir. 1950).
13 374 U.S. 826 (1963).
14 374 U.S. 825 (1963).
15 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 6, at 225.
26 U.S. Coxsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
'rFederal statutes concerning patents are now the subject matter of
35 U.S.C. (1958); those concerning copyrights are collected in 17 U.S.C.
(1958).
's The Court cited the case of Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963),
wherein it was held that a state could not interfere with the practice of a
patent agent-not a member of the bar-who had been duly admitted to
practice by the Patent Office.
19 The Court referred to Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.
173 (1942), in which it had held state law regarding estoppel inapplicable
to an antitrust claim arising out of a license agreement based upon a patent
which was held to be invalid. A unanimous Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Stone, distinguished Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
saying, "the doctrine of that case is inapplicable to those areas of judicial
1964 ]
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viewing the concepts of patent law, the Court reached the
principle upon which its decision was based-that upon the
expiration of a patent the public has the right to copy the
previously patented article in precisely the shape it carried
when protected by the patent."
Mr. Justice Black declared:
Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its
expiration date or give a patent on an article which lacked the
level of invention required for federal patents. To do either
would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents
only to true inventions, and then only for a limited time. Just
as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent law directly,
it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair
competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives
of the federal patent laws.
... [M]ere inability of the public to tell two identical articles
apart is not enough to support an injunction against copying or
an award of damages for copying that which the federal patent laws
permit to be copied.21
In his opinion in Compco, Mr. Justice Black restated
the principle:
To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found
in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution and in the implementing
federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal
patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.
22
The holding in Compco appears to go beyond that in Sears.
Referring to the district court's findings that the arrange-
decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep
of federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be deemed
governed by federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by
local law." Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., supra at 176.
The implications of Mr. Justice Black's citation of the Sola case were
apparently disregarded by one commentator who has written that "the delega-
tion of the patent right to exclude is to be distinguished from the delegation
from the states to the Federal Government of the power to control copying
in the absence of a patent." Chapman, The Supreme Court and Federal Law
of Unfair Competition, 54 TRADEMARx REP. 573, 579 (1964).
20 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 6, at 230.
21 Id. at 231-32.
22376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
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ment of the ribbing of Day-Brite's fixture had acquired a
secondary meaning 'ike a trademark," Mr. Justice Black
stated "but if the design is not entitled to a design patent
or other Federal statutory protection, then it can be copied
at will. 2 3
In both decisions Mr. Justice Black indicated that a
state could legitimately take steps to reduce or eliminate
the confusion that would result when competitors copy
unprotected designs. In Sears he said that
i
doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being
misled as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the
use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging
of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings,
from misleading purchasers as to source of the goods.24
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the result in both
cases, but in a separate opinion, indicated that he would
permit a state to restrict copying when it appeared to have
been undertaken with the purpose of "palming off" one's
goods as those of another or of confusing customers as to
the source of such goods.25
FEDERAL TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF DEsIGNS
Three days after the decisions of the Supreme Court
in Sears and Compeo, holding that state unfair competition
laws could not be used to protect a design which was not
entitled to protection under the federal design patent law,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in the case of
In re Mogen David Wine Corp.," held that a design which
was protected by federal design patent law for the limited
period permitted by that law, could, in certain circum-
stances, be protected under the federal trademark law even
231d. at 238. (Emphasis added.)
24 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 6, at 232.
25 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964).
26328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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after the expiration of the design patent. This decision
permits the originator of a design, which might otherwise
be freely copied upon the expiration of the design patent
obtained for it, to seek to enjoin such copying by suing
those guilty of copying it for infringement of the trademark
right which the originator has acquired in the design. The
decision does not, of course, discuss the Sears and Compeo
decisions handed down only a few days earlier. While the
Mogen David decision involved an application to register
a container as a trademark for the goods sold in it, the
court has subsequently, in the case of In, re Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co.,27 permitted the registration of a mark
consisting of the over-all configuration of the goods them-
selves.
The Mogen David and Minnesota Mining cases are the
latest in a line of Patent Office and Yourt of Customs and
Patent Appeals decisions which have created perpetual
federal protection for the creators of successful commercial
designs. The test applied in these cases is not whether the
design rises to the level of originality at which it will be
afforded design patent protection, nor whether after the ex-
piration of the design patent the public should be free to copy
the design, but whether a monopoly in the use of the design
granted through federal trademark registration will hinder
competition in the goods sought to be covered by the reg-
istration of the alleged design-trademark. The protection
granted is based upon congressional enactment under the
commerce clause, rather than under the patent and copyright
clause.2"
In 1954 the Commissioner of Patents held, in Ex parte
Caron Corp.,2" that a bottle configuration, which had once
been the subject of a design patent, could, after the expira-
tion of the design patent, be the subject of a trademark
registration on the Supplemental Register."0 After con-
2751 C.C.P.A. (Patents) -, - F.2d -, 142 U.S.P.Q. 366 (1964).
28 See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), holding unconstitu-
tional the Trade-Mark Act of 1870 which bad been based upon the patent
and copyright clause.
29 100 U.S.P.Q. 356 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1954).
30 Trademarks not otherwise registrable but which are capable of dis-
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sidering the nature of design patents and of trademarks,31
Assistant Commissioner Leeds declared that
it is apparent from the foregoing that the functions of design
patents and trade marks and the purposes underlying their pro-
tection are different; and the protection accorded a trade mark
cannot, in any real sense, be considered an extension of the
protection accorded a patented design.32
Although the Caron decision held that the exclusive use
of the design patent by the patentee was not the exclusive
use necessary to acquire rights in the design as a trademark
since that use begins only after the expiration of the patent
when the design falls into the public domain," the Trade-
tinguishing the proprietor's goods and have been used in commerce for a
year prior to the filing of the application for registration may be registered
on the Supplemental Register established by § 23 of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 435, 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1958).
31 "A design patent may be obtained by any person who invents any new,
original and ornamental design for an article. The patent protects only the
appearance of the article, and does not protect its structural or utilitarian
features. A design patent is a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns,
for a term of years (in this case the term was fourteen years) conferring
the right to exclude others from making, using for any purpose, or selling
the article covered by the patent.
"The registration of a distinguishing mark in trade may be obtained by
any person who owns the mark as a result of using it to identify his goods
and distinguish them from those of others.
"The function of a design patent is to protect the patentee in his right
to exclude others from making, using or selling the article.
"The function of a trademark is to indicate origin of goods-to identify
and distinguish the goods of one person from those of another.
"The purpose underlying the protection of patented designs is to grant
exclusivity of the design of the article to the patentee for a term of years
as a reward for his ultimate contribution to the public of something new,
original and ornamental. The patent affords protection to the design itself.
"The purposes underlying the protection of trademarks are: (1) recogni-
tion of the right of potential purchasers to get that which they ask for and
want to get without being confused, deceived, or mistaken as to the source
of goods, anonymous though that source may be; and (2) recognition of
the right of the owner of a mark to be protected in his investment of time,
energy and money in presenting his product to the public under the mark.
The trademark affords protection to the good will of the product and of
the business symbolized by the mark." 100 U.S.P.Q. 356, 358 (Dec. Comm'r
Pat. 1954).
3 2 1d. at 358-59.
33 "During the fourteen year term of the patent, applicant was fully pro-
tected against all uses by others, and use of the bottle by applicant during
that period probably was not a use which would entitle it to claim any
rights under the trademark laws. The 'exclusive use' during that period
was by virtue of its right to exclude under the patent laws and was not
1964]
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mark Trial and Appeal Board, in an opinion also written
by Assistant Commissioner Leeds, subsequently permitted
the registration of a bottle configuration protected by a
design patent even before the expiration of the patent. In
the case of In re The Pepsi-Cola Co.,84 an application for the
registration of a bottle design as a trademark for carbonated
beverages was rejected by the Examiner of Trademarks,
who held that registration was precluded by the existence
of an unexpired design patent on the bottle. The Board
reversed this decision, declaring that the trademark registra-
tion of configurations protected by design patents was con-
templated by the framers of the Trademark Act of 1946,"5
and that there was nothing inconsistent about the simulta-
neous existence of a design patent on a bottle, protecting
the patentee against copying of the bottle, and registration
of the bottle's design on the Supplemental Trademark
Register-indicating that the design of the bottle is capable
of distinguishing the source of the soft drink contained
therein.
Prior to the decision in the Pepsi-Cola case, the Ex-
ainer-in-Chief had rejected an application by Alan Wood
Steel Co. for registration on the Supplemental Register of
a particular design for projections on metal floor plate."8
Such projections serve a useful function in reducing the
danger that someone walking on the metal plate might slip.
Evidence was introduced indicating that manufacturers in
the industry arranged the ridges on their plate in differ-
ent patterns and that the pattern did serve as an indication
of origin. The Examiner-in-Chief found, however, that the
principal function of the patterned ridges was utilitarian
and denied the registration because of this functional feature
of the design, declaring that
the 'exclusive use' contemplated by the trademark law as a distinguishing
mark." Id. at 360.
84 120 U.S.P.Q. 468 (Pat. Off. T. T. & App. Bd. 1959).
35 Principally to insure protection for U.S. nationals against design and
trademark piracy in various foreign countries in which trademark rights are
based solely upon registration and in which a foreign applicant must prove
that its mark is registered in its home country to succeed in obtaining a
registration. Hearings on HR. 4744, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 126-27 (1939).
36Ex parte Alan Wood Steel Co., 101 U.S.P.Q. 209 (1954).
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the fact that the design is recognizable is not sufficient to make it
registrable, for if this were the criterion then every article made
by one manufacturer in a form somewhat different from articles
of like kind made by others would be registrable as an alleged
mark.3 7
Appeal was taken to the District Court for the District of
,Columbia," which affirmed -the decision of the Patent Office 9
in a decision in which Judge Holtzoff anticipated the
language and reasoning of Mr. Justice Black in the Seacrs
and (ompco decisions.4 0 The decision in Alan Wood Steel
Co. v. Watson"' was relied upon by both the Examiner and
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in rejecting the
application of Deister Concentrator Company for the regis-
tration on the Principal Register, under Section 2(f) of
the Lanham Act, of a rhomboidal design as a trademark
for ore concentrating and coal cleaning tables."3 The design
for which registration was sought was an outline of the
87Id. at 211.
38 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1952) permitted an applicant who chose not to appeal
an adverse decision of the Patent Office to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals to bring a civil action against the Commissioner of Patents in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which court can
order the issuance of the previously refused registration. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(1962).39 Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1957).40 
"An object performing a utilitarian function may not be registered as
a trademark even if it also identifies the applicant's product. A novel shape
or appearance that is functional in character may not acquire any secondary
meaning that would render it subject to exclusive appropriation as a trade-
mark. J. R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Products Co., 5 Cir., 219 F.2d
313, 320. This court is, therefore, of the opinion that the decision of the
Patent Office in this respect is sound. Were the law otherwise, it would
be possible for a manufacturer or dealer, who is unable to secure a patent
on . . his design, to obtain a monopoly on an unpatentable device by
registering it as a trade-mark. The potential consequence to the public might
be very serious, because while a patent is issued for only a limited term, a
trade-mark becomes the permanent property of its owner and secures for him
a monopoly in perpetuity." Id. at 862.4
. Supa note 39.42 Providing that a trademark which has "become distinctive of the ap-
plicant's goods in commerce" may be registered on the Principal Register
and that the Commissioner may accept proof of exclusive and continuous
use of the trademark by the applicant for five years as prima facie evidence
of distinctiveness. 60 Stat. 428, 15 U.S.C. § 1952(f) (1958).43 In re Deister Concentrator Co., 121 U.S.P.Q.. 633 (Pat. Off. T. T. &
App. Bd. 1959).
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shape of the applicant's tables. Evidence indicated that the
particular shape employed by the applicant was functional
in character. On this ground the application was rejected.
The applicant appealed the rejection to the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals. The court, in the case of In
re Deister Concentrator CO.'4 with the opinion by Judge
Rich, affirmed the decision of the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board. Citing the Alan Wood Steel case with
approval, Judge Rich declared that
to give appellant the Trademark registration it asks for here would
give it a potential perpetual monopoly on the outline shape of its
shaking table deck. The basic issue here is whether the law permits
such a monopoly.45
The court concluded that the law did not permit such a
monopoly, because such a monopoly would be contrary to
"the socio-economic policy supported by the general law [of]
the encouragement of competition by all fair means. .. .
Rejecting the applicant's argument that the outline of the
shape of its table was entitled to registration because it
had acquired secondary meaning indicative of source, the
court distinguished between "de facto secondary meaning"
and secondary meaning to which the courts will attach legal
consequences. It concluded that
the clear weight of authority shows that the courts will not
support exclusive rights in any word or shape which, in their
opinion, the public has a right to use in the absence of patent
or copyright protection.4 7
Among these unprotected words and shapes are shapes
which are basically functional in nature. That the public
might attach secondary meaning to such a shape was deemed
irrelevant. 8 The court was careful to point out, however,
4448 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 952, 289 F.2d 496 (1961).
451d. at 960, 289 F.2d at 499.
461d. at 961, 289 F.2d at 501.
471d. at 965, 289 F.2d at 503.
48 "A certain amount of purchaser confusion may even be tolerated in
order to give the public the advantages of free competition. . . . In final
analysis it would seem to be self-evident that government economic policy as
reflected in law must be determined by the legislature and judiciary and
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that the fact that a shape was utilitarian would not deprive
it of trademark protection where it is "in its concept
arbitrary."49 The court did not distinguish in this statement
between shapes of packages and shapes of goods themselves.
The Caron and Deister decisions were cited by the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in refusing an applica-
tion to register a decanter bottle design on the Principal
Register in the case of In re Mogen David Wine Corp."
The design which was the subject of the application was the
subject of an unexpired design patent owned by the ap-
plicant. The Board distinguished the Pepsi-Cola decision
by pointing out that registration on the Supplemental
Register-which had been sought in the Pepsi-Cola case-
affords the registrant no presumptive right to exclusive use,
whereas the registration on the Principal Register-which
the applicant was seeking-would create such a right., This,
it reasoned, would be equivalent to an extension of the
design patent and contrary to the intent and purpose of
the patent law.15 The Board cited Caron to support its
contention that the applicant's use during the life of the
design patent did not constitute trademark use and cited
Deister to support its opinion that the design was not
registrable in any event because of its functionality.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected
each of the Board's propositions.52 Rejecting the rationale
of the Carom dicta, it held that to preclude consideration
for trademark registration purposes of the use of a design
during ,the existence of a design patent would create an
exception to the use provisions of the Lanham Act which
Congress had not seen fit to enact." The court likewise
cannot be left to depend wholly on the attitudes, reactions or beliefs of the
purchasing public. Public acceptance of a functional feature as an indication
of source is, therefore, not determinative of right to register. Preservation
of freedom to copy 'functional' features is the determining factor." Id. at
966, 289 F.2d at 504.
491d. at 968, 289 F.2d at 506.
50 134 U.S.P.Q. 576 (Pat. Off. T. T. & App. Bd. 1962).
;1 Id. at 578.
N2TI re Mogen David Wine Corp., 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1170, 328 F.2d
925 (1964).
53 "It was within the province of Congress to write an exception in the
provisions of the statute to preclude use of the subject matter of a design
1964 ]
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disagreed with the Board's refusal to follow the rationale
of the Pepsi-Cola decision in Principal Register cases. It
indicated that the distinction to be drawn in design patent-
trademark cases involved not the differences between the
Principal and Supplemental Trademark Registers but
between the patent and trademark laws. The court declared
that patent and trademark rights exist independently of
one another and that termination of one right does not
affect the existence of the other. 4 The court held that the
Board had misapplied the Deister decision where the design
had been "in essence utilitarian." In the present case, the
design, while utilitarian in that it enabled the container
to hold wine, possessed a sufficient degree of distinctiveness
to enable it to acquire that secondary meaning which is
entitled to protection.5
Judge Rich, who had written the opinion in Deister,
concurred in a separate opinion. He distinguished the case
involving the functional shape of goods themselves-such
as the Deister table-from that involving the arbitrary
shape of a container for goods-such as the Mogen David
wine bottle, stating that "whether competition would in
fact be hindered is really the crux of the matter." 11 To have
granted Deister Concentrator Co. trademark protection for
the functional design of its separating table would have
patent during the life of the patent as trademark use. It did not see fit to do
so. The language of Section 2 . . . of the act is clear and forthright in its
embrace of the situation here, assuming that the mark is one 'by which the
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others' and
'the mark used by the applicant has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce.' To hold, as did the board, that an existing design
patent precludes even distinctive marks from registration would be tanta-
mount to writing an exception into the statute excluding consideration of use
during the life of a design patent. This we cannot do.
"Furthermore, the decision of the board would in effect nullify or suspend
the provisions of Section 1 . . . relating to date of first use and first use
in commerce, which makes no exception as to use during the life of a design
patent." Id. at -, 328 F.2d at 931.
54 "The underlying purpose and the essence of patent rights are separate
and distinct from those appertaining to trademarks. No right accruing from
the one is dependent upon or conditioned by any' right concomitant to the
other. The longevity of the exclusivity of one is limited by law while the
other may be extended in perpetuity." Id. at -, 328 F.2d at 929.
55 Id. at -- 328 F.2d at 931-32.
t6 Id. at -- 328 F.2d at 933.
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precluded competition in separating tables of this advanced
design. To grant trademark protection for the design of
the decanter to Mogen David Wine Corp. would not hinder
competition in wine. Indeed, as Judge Rich pointed out,
it might stimulate such competition by causing Mogen
David's competitors to develop attractive decanters of their
own if they believed that the attractiveness of the bottle was
a factor in stimulating sales of wine. In both instances
the court was fostering the important public policy of stim-
ulating competition.
In another opinion by Judge Rich, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, in In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,"
held that the principles of the Deister decision are likewise
applicable to registration of designs consisting of the over-all
configuration of the goods which are to be protected by the
registration. Minnesota Mining applied for registration
on the Supplemental Register of the design or configuration
of a promoter-chemical in solid form which was used in a
process of non-electrolytic metal plating. Testimony was
introduced to show that the shape in which the goods were
manufactured and sold was intended to be distinctive of
their origin, and that it was entirely arbitrary. Minnesota
Mining relied upon Section 23 of the Lanham Act" estab-
lishing the Supplemental Register and providing for the
registration thereon of marks consisting of a configuration
of goods capable of being distinguished as the goods of
the applicant.59 The Examiner rejected the application on
the ground that section 23 protected the particular con-
figuration of a part of an article, but not the over-all con-
figuration. On appeal, the Examiner's decision was affirmed
by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.6"
57 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) -, - F2d -, 142 U.S.P.Q. 366 (1964).
58 60 Stat. 435, 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1958).
59 Ibid. Section 23 provides for the registration of "any trademark, symbol,
label, package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase, sur-
name, geographical name, numeral or device or any combination of any of
the foregoing, but such mark must be capable of distinguishing the applicant's
goods or services." It thus distinguishes between technical trademarks and
many other devices which are commonly considered trademarks and may
become trademarks, and hence registrable on the Principal Register, with
the establishment of secondary meaning.
60 136 U.S.P.O. 676 (Pat. Off. T. T. & App. Bd. 1962) (memorandum
decision).
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Howeyer, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
held that section 23 contained no such limitation and that
under the provisions of the statute the mark was entitled
to registration if it was capable of distinguishing the goods
as those of the applicant. Whether it actually did so-
that is, whether secondary meaning had been established-
was held to be irrelevant for a Supplemental Register ap-
plication. The court reviewed the extent of protection
possible through registration and the policy of promoting
competition, which must be considered in determining
whether registration may be granted to a particular design,
stating,
to sum up the statutory law applicable to this case, since this
application is to register on the Supplemental Register, the overall
configuration of appellant's goods need not be a trademark but
only a "mark capable of distinguishing applicant's goods" from
the goods of others, in other words a mark which miqht be a trade-
mark registrable on the Principal Register, upon proof of established
secondary meaning. Applicable in addition to the statutory con-
siderations are those policy considerations, which could prevent
registration on the Principal Register, considered in our opinion
in In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 CCPA 952, 289 F.2d 496,
129 USPQ 314, which apply equally to registration on both
registers. 6 '
The Mogen David and Minnesota Mining decisions il-
lustrate and emphasize the importance of Mr. Justice Black's
holding in Compco that "if the design is not entitled to a
design patent or other federal statutory protection, then
it can be copied at will." 62 Neither Stiffel, which did
not prove the existence of secondary meaning in its lamp
design, nor Day-Brite, which did establish secondary mean-
ing in its fixture design, was without means of protecting
its designs if the designs were, in fact, capable of serving
as indications of origin. Had they sought the protection
of the federal trademark statute, rather than that of state
common law in a federally pre-empted area, they might
have been successful in their efforts to protect their designs.
6151 C.C.P.A. (Patents) , , F.2d -- -, 142 U.S.P.Q. 366, 368
(1964).




At early common law a merchant had the right to freely
copy the goods of his competitors.6 3 Under the Tudors this
right was gradually restricted by the grant to royal favorites
of letters patent giving those so favored the right to mon-
opolize certain trades. Abuses in this system led to the
enactment, in 1623, of the Statute of Monopolies, 4 which
declared all monopolies "utterly void and of no effect."
The statute contained, however, an exception permitting
monopolies to be granted to inventors of new manufactures
by letters patent which were limited to a term of fourteen
years. However, such -patents were not to be granted if
they were "mischievous to the State, by raising Prices of
Commodities at home, or Hurt of Trade, or generally
inconvenient." 65
Prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution
the several states had similarly granted patents and con-
tinued to do so for some time thereafter.66 However, since
"the States cannot separately make effectual provisions"
for the granting of patents and copyrights, 7 the Con-
stitutional Convention provided that the Congress would
have the power "to promote the Progress of Science and
63 The leading early case on monopolies is Darcy v. Allein, 11 Coke's Rep.
84 (K-B. 1602), in which a royal grant of a monopoly for the manufacture
of playing cards was held to be invalid as contrary to the common law.
In the case of The Clothworkers of Ipswich, Code 252, 77 Eng. Rep. 147
(K.B. 1615), the court held that "if a man hath brought in a new invention
and a new trade within the kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption
of his estate and stock, etc. or if a man hath made a new discovery of any
thing, in such cases the King of his grace and favor, in recompense of his
costs and travail, may grant by charter unto him, that he only shall use
such a trade or trafique for a certain time, because at first the people of
the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the knowledge or skill to use it:
but when that patent is expired, the King cannot make a new grant thereof:
for when the trade is become common, and others have been bound apprentices
in the same trade, there is no reason why such should be forbidden to use it."
The Clothworkers of Ipswich, supra at 148.
6- 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3.
65 Ibid.
G6 For a discussion of the history of patent law in England and the United
States see Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded by Patent,
Tradermrk, Copyright and Unfair Competition Law, A.P.L.A. BULL. 283
(1964).67 ~e FEDEAIIST NO. 43, at 288 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison).
1964]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 68 This constitutional provision and the laws
enacted by Congress pursuant to it were to be "... the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 69
The powers granted to the federal government in the
patent and copyright clause do not include the power to
protect trademarks.7 0 This power remained with the states
as part of the common law of unfair competition, since
Congress had power to protect trademarks only insofar
as their use affected interstate commerce.71 It is important
to note that at the time the Consitution was adopted the
common law did not prohibit the copying of designs but
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (Emphasis added.)
9 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Mr. Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821), summarized the operation of the
supremacy clause: "The constitution and laws of a state, so far as they
are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely
void."
76 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).7 1 Id. at 96-98. Compare the report by Secretary of State Thomas Jeffer-
son to the House of Representatives:
"December 9, 1791.
"The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of Repre-
sentatives the petition of Samuel Breck and others, proprietors of a sail-
cloth manufactory in Boston, praying that they may have the exclusive priv-
ilege of using particular marks for designating the sail-cloth of their
manufactory, has had the same underconsideration, and thereupon
"Reports, That it would, in his opinion, contribute to fidelity in the
execution of manufacturers to secure to every manufactory, an exclusive
right to some mark on its wares proper to itself.
"That this should be done by general laws, extending equal right to every
case to which the authority of the Legislature should be competent.
"That these cases are of divided jurisdiction: Manufacturers made and
consumed within a State being subject to State legislation, while those which
are exported to foreign nations, or to another State, or into the Indian
Territory, are alone within the legislation of the General Government.
"That it will, therefore be reasonable for the General Government to
provide in this behalf by law for those cases of manufacture generally, and
those only which relate to commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and within the Indian Tribes.
"And that this may be done by permitting the owner of every manu-
factory to enter in the records of the court of the district wherein his
manufactory is, the name with which he chooses to mark or designate his
wares, and rendering it penal in others to put the same mark to any other




was basically restricted to the tort known in British law
as "passing-off," which basically involved the representation
that one's goods were those of a competitor. 2 Since that
time, however, state unfair competition law has gradually
been extended to a variety of commercial torts. When the
lower court decisions in Sears and (ompca applied the law
of Illinois and thereby granted greater protection to
commercial designs than that available under federal law, a
constitutional conffict was created.
In the development of the law of unfair competition
in Illinois inadequate consideration had been given to the
promotion of competition-a consideration of the utmost
importance in our economic system. As Mr. Justice Burton
emphasized in Standard Oil Co. -v. Federal Trade (Jomm'n, 73
"the heart of our national* economic policy long has been
faith in the value of competition." It was the promotion
of this policy which guided the Supreme Court in Sears
and Compco and which the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals found controlling in Deister and Mogen David.
Illinois' attempt to extend protection to originators
of commercial designs beyond that available under the
federal design patent and copyright laws, by granting pro-
tection of unlimited duration to originators of designs
which lacked the originality necessary for federal protection,
ran contrary to the intention of the drafters of the patent
and copyright clause that authors and inventors should be
protected only for limited times. It ran counter, as well,
to the intent of Congress in requiring that patent applicants
must meet a minimum standard of inventiveness. As such
it was, as was held in Sears and (ompco, an unconstitutional
invasion by the state of a federally pre-empted area of the
law.
72 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR ComrITIow AND TRADn-MAfxs § 4.1 (2d ed.
1950). For a discussion of the early development of trademark law in the
United States see SCHECHTER, op. cit. supra note 71, at 130-34.
73340 U.S. 231, 248 (1950). Cf. statement by Judge Rich in Application
of Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 952, 961-62, 289 F.2d
496, 501 (1961) : "It is basic to our consideration, therefore, that the socio-
economic policy supported by the general law is the encouragement of com-
petition by all fair means, and that encompasses the right to copy, very
broadly interpreted, except where copying is lawfully prevented by a copy-
right or patent"
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THE IMPACT OF Sears AND CompCo
In spite of the importance to our national economic
policy of promoting competition, the Sears and Compeo
decisions have been criticized as reaching a "startling" re-
sult and "represent[ing] a lowering of the standards of
commercial morality." I While all competition may be
characterized by the originator of a product or a service
as "unfair," it is obvious that a certain amount of freedom
in borrowing and adapting competitors' ideas and methods
is necessary in an expanding competitive economy. At what
point do these competitive practices become of such a nature
as to justify judicial or statutory restriction and hence
merit legal classification as unfair competition?
Mr. Justice Black took care to point out in both Sears 7
and Compco 70 that a state's inability, because of con-
stitutional considerations, to enjoin the copying of a design
74 Diamond, Scope of "Lamp Pole" Cases Debated, N.Y.P.L.A. BuLL. 1
(May 1964).
75 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
76 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., suprz note 62, at 238. Cf.
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Tas-T-Nut
Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 6 (6th Cir. 1957). "The differ-
ence in the protection against imitation which will be accorded to an article
of commerce on' the one hand, and to a package in which the article is
marketed on the other, was long ago noted. Writing for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Howay, 1901, 178
Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667, that court's then Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
pointed out that the law which permits one to market an identical copy of
his competitor's product does not give him freedom to imitate the appearance
of the package in which the article is sold. As there pointed out, the public
policy which permits the imitation of an article of commerce is without
relevance to the dress in which the article is marketed. '[T]he label or
ornament is a relatively small and incidental affair, which would not exist
at all or at least would not exist in that shape but for the intent to deceive;
whereas the instrument sold is made as it is partly at least, because of a
supposed or established desire of the public for instruments in that form.'
"The same point was recently made by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 9 Cir., 1952,
198 F.2d 339. In that case the court said: 'If the particular feature is an
important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the interest
in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copy-
right. On the other hand, where the feature or, more aptly, design, is a
mere arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily
adopted for purposes of identification and individuality and, hence, unrelated
to basic consumer demands in connection with the product, imitation may be




not protected by a patent or copyright did not leave it
powerless to prevent unfair competition. Alluding to the
fact that the trial court in Uompco had found that the
plaintiff's design had acquired a secondary meaning, he held
that nevertheless the design could be copied at will if.
it "is not entitled to a design patent or other federal
statutory protection." 77 Under the rationale of the Deister
and Mogen David decisions this federal statutory protection
may include trademark registration if such registration does
not hinder competition in the goods." In other words,
the secondary meaning the merchant has built up in his
design will be protected unless doing so would run counter
to the fundamental public policy of promoting competition
in the goods with which the design is associated."9
Further federal statutory protection may be made avail-
able to the owner of a design which lacks the qualities neces-
sary to obtain the protection of a design patent. A bill
introduced in the last session of Congress by Representative
Lindsay and Senator Javits would have provided civil
remedies to persons damaged by unfair commercial activities
in commerce.80 The intent of this legislation, which is
likely to be reintroduced in the Eighty-Ninth Congress,
would be to obviate Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 81 in this area and
to create a federal law of unfair competition. A federal
district court hearing an unfair competition claim based
upon federal legislation would not be presented with 'the
constitutional problem that arose in Sears and Compeo.
The effect of Sears and Compco upon state law has
been considered in several cases by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, the New York Supreme Court,
and by several federal courts. Their decisions lend weight
77 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., supra note 62. (Emphasis
added.)78 See Judge Rich's formulation of the test in his concurring opinion in
In re Mogen David W"ine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932-33 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
79 See Derenberg, The Seventeenth Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 54 TRADEMAR_ REP. 660-62 (1964), for a discussion
of the possible development of the law relating to trademark protection of
container designs, written prior to the decision of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in the Minnesota Mining case.
8o S. 1038, H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
81304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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to the view that the Sears and Compco holdings will be
interpreted narrowly and will not be used to countenance
all manner of commercial immorality.
Two federal district courts, following Sears and (ompco,
have refused to enjoin the copying of unpatented designs.
In Int'l Riotical Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.82
the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to restrain
the continued infringement of a design patent, the validity
of which had not been adjudicated. Plaintiff argued that
since Sears and (ompco had limited the basis upon which
the courts may grant protection in unfair competition cases,
the courts should broaden the protection given in patent
and copyright cases and could enjoin unfair competition
of the nature alleged. The court denied the motion, stating
that in the second circuit relief in such cases had always
been limited to those instances in which the defendant's
actions misled or deceived the consumer.8 The court found
that the plaintiff had failed to prove either secondary
meaning or predatory practices on the part of the defendant.
In Jerrold Stephens Co. v. Alladin Plastics, Inc.,"
the plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment that a design
patent for plastic bucket seats was invalid while the
defendant counterclaimed, seeking an injunction to prevent
copying of its design by plaintiff. The court found the
patent invalid as being "wholly lacking in even the most
liberal conception of the standard of invention to be
applied." 85 It then dismissed the counterclaim for copying
and a related counterclaim based upon an allegation that
the plainiff had interfered with its relationship with its
customers.
The seventh circuit considered the effect of Sears and
Compco in Aerosol Research Co. 'v. Scovill Mfg. Co.,"
82229 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
83 The court relied upon Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H.G. Salzman, Inc.,
302 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1962); American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d
287 (2d Cir. 1960); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d
569 (2d Cir. 1959); and Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
8 229 F. Supp. 536 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
8 Id. at 539.86 334 F2d 751 (7th Cir. 1964).
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wherein plaintiff had brought suit for infringement of its
patented aerosol valve and for unfair competition based
upon copying of its unpatented spray tips. The district
court, 7 prior to the Supreme Court decisions in Sears and
Compco, found the patent valid and infringed and also
found that the defendant had competed unfairly with plain-
tiff in copying its spray tips. Appeal was taken to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which decided the case
after the Supreme Court decisions in Sears and (ompco,
and reversed the district court's holding that the-defendant
had been guilty of unfair competition. The circuit court
noted that there was no evidence that the defendant had
"palmed off" its spray tips as plaintiff's, nor that it had
intended or attempted to mislead or deceive customers as
to their origin.8
State courts have granted relief in several unfair
competition cases decided since the Sears and Uompco
decisions. Their opinions indicate that the cases will be
construed narrowly and that deliberate attempts to mislead
the public will not be permitted, although the mere copying
of unprotected designs, so labelled as to not deceive the
public as to their source, will not be enjoined.
The New York Supreme Court, in Wolf 4- Vine, Inc.
v. Pioneer Display Fixture Co..," dismissed an unfair com-
petition complaint based upon the copying of mannequins
not protected by a patent or copyright. It found that the
manner in which the defendants had marketed their man-
nequins precluded any finding of "palming off" and held
ST 137 U.S.P.Q. 701 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
S8 In Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964),
the ninth circuit relied upon Sears and Compco in reversing a decision of
the District Court for the District of Idaho enjoining the operations of a
community television antenna service which picked up programs from distant
stations and distributed them in competition with the local network outlet.
The district court had held that this activity constituted unfair competition
under Idaho law. Noting that no claim of copyright infringement had been
made, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to permit
new pleadings, holding that "unless appellees are able to demonstrate a pro-
tectible interest by virtue of the copyright laws or bring themselves within
the contemplation of some other recognized exception to the policy promoting
free access to all matter in the public domain, they cannot prevail: Cable
Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., supra at 354.
89 142 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.Y. 1964).
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that in the absence of conduct on the part of the de-
fendants "stimulating confusion" the plaintiffs could not
have prevailed under existing New York law °0  The court
cited Sears and Compco to buttress this conclusion.9
In E. H. Wood Associates v. Skene 92 the Massachusetts
court considered the effect of Sears and Compeo on a claim
of unfair competition based upon infringement of a common-
law copyright. 93  It held that a provision of the Copyright
Act,94 alluded to in a footnote in the Sears decision, saved
to the states their traditional jurisdiction over such claims
and that this jurisdiction was not affected by Sears and
Compc. 5
The New York Supreme Court, in applying Sears and
Compco to unfair competition cases arising before it, has
distinguished cases involving copying from those involving
direct appropriation of the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff
in Flamingo Telefilm Sales v. United Artists Corp. 6 alleged
that the defendant had exhibited as part of a television
program a substantial portion of a motion picture to which
the plaintiff had sole television rights. Defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint, relying upon Sears and Compeo.
The court denied the motion saying, of Sears and Compeo,
"however, in those cited cases the court was concerned with
the copying of an unpatented and uncopyrighted product.
This is to be distinguished from the instant case where
901d. at 114.
91 Ibid.
92 141 U.S.P.Q. 454 (Mass. 1964).
93 Comman-law copyright protects the author of works which have not
been published; statutory copyright was created to protect the author of a
published work. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346-47
(1908).
9417 U.S.C. §2 (1958) provides: "Nothing in this title shall be con-
strued to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an un-
published work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publica-
tions, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain
damages therefor."
9 A similar result was reached by the New York Supreme Court in
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42




the complaint, essentially, is of an appropriation of the very
item licensed." 11
This decision was followed in Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Greatest Records, IncY in which the court granted a
temporary injunction forbidding the continued sale of a
record album which defendants had prepared by tape
recording portions of the plaintiff's "Beatles" albums.
Replying to defendant's contention that such conduct was
permitted under Sears and (ompco, the court declared:
"Neither of those learned decisions stands for the proposition
that this plaintiff is not entitled to protection against the
unauthorized appropriation, reproduction or duplication of
the actual performances contained in its records." 11
In New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Golour-
picture Publishers, Inc., ° an unsuccessful bidder for the
World's Fair postcard license began selling postcards, off
the site which featured various fair exhibits and scenes.
The Fair management sought a preliminary injunction pro-
hibiting further sales. Defendant argued that its conduct
was permitted under Sears and (ompco. The court rejected
this argument and granted the injunction, stating that:
No attempt is being made in this case to give "perpetual protection"
to an article in trade "too lacking in novelty to merit any patent
at all," but to give protection for a brief two-year period to the
valuable property rights of the spectacular and unique educational
effort of a nonprofit organization.10 1
CONCLUSION
From the decisions which have been rendered since
Sears and Compeo, it appears that the state courts and
the lower federal courts which apply state law are adopting
a rule of reason in concrete cases wherein the doctrine of
the above discussed decisions is involved. In cases where
97Id., 141 U.S.P.Q. at 462.
9843 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
9 Id. at bY80, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
100 151 N.Y.L.J., June 11, 1964, p. 16, col. 1, 142 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y.
1964).
10 Id., 142 LLS.P.Q. at 942.
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the only wrong alleged is the copying of a design which
is so lacking in originality as not to deserve design patent
protection and which has not acquired sufficient protectible
secondary meaning to be entitled to federal trademark reg-
istration, the courts are applying ancient common-law
doctrine and permitting the copying. But where the copier
seeks to mislead or deceive the consuming public his actions
are likely to be enjoined. It is submitted that in this manner
both the important economic objective of promoting com-
petition and the moral objective of keeping that competition
fair are being well balanced.
